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Summary 
 
Ukraine is suffering from low level of innovation activities and widening gap between the industry and 
research institutions, both in government and higher education sectors. This is reflected in shrinking of 
R&D financing, declining share of a number of graduates in natural sciences and engineering and some oth-
er indicators. Orientation on development of traditional industries of the national economies, such as 
metallurgy, basic chemicals and agricultural products prevents the country from focusing on knowledge 
production sectors. Lack of demand for R&D results widens the gap between the remaining R&D establish-
ments and the industrial enterprises. Ukrainian state innovation policy has not changed substantially in 
recent years. Up to now, the main focus of government policy mix is on direct support of innovation 
in the form of (partial) financing of S&T programs and provision of direct financing to selected innovation 
projects. The gap between the higher education sector and the industry is substantial. Current legislation 
does not allow universities or research institutes to be founders of a spin-off company with non-state 
ownership in Ukraine. At the same time, it is evident that problems of innovation development could 
be solved only within broader context of transformation of the national economy. Implementation of 
the Triple Helix (TH) concept for transformation of the Ukrainian national R&D and innovation system 
could open new opportunities for its development.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent decades, a number of concepts of national innovation systems were evolved 
to open the way for complex studies of the industrial and S&T systems in different 
countries. Triple Helix (TH) concept possesses an important place among them as 
it opens the way for comprehensive analysis of not only industrial sector and government 
sectors, but also for studies of interrelations between them and the universities. In reality, 
universities and other learning institutions play crucial role in the process of innovation 
development and growth of competitiveness of the national economies.  
Introduction of new technologies and growth of competitiveness are interrelated 
processes, with technological advance is the central driving force behind economic 
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growth [Nelson, Nelson, 2002]. However, it is difficult to determine these connections 
quantitatively in terms reasons and results [Dosi, Teece, eds., 1997]. At the firm level, 
final success depends not purely on ‘technological’ factors but also on organizational 
framework of the company, situation in the market, sector specificity and so on. In 
general, higher innovativeness is associated with higher competitiveness. So, in 1990- 
-2000s, the share of innovative enterprises in Ukrainian economy was between 6% and 
20%, while in neighbouring Poland it was at least two times higher [Innovation in the 
Polish Economy…, 2010]. These figures correlate with all major indexes of competitiveness 
for national economies, which are used for international comparison. However, the level 
of innovativeness could not be itself an indicator of commercial success.  
In conditions of growing role of knowledge in modern economy, companies are 
modifying their businesses with the aim to increase ‘intellectual’ components in their as-
sets and to strengthen their ties with universities. In general, intellectual assets are 
playing a growing role in production processes, especially in hi-tech sectors. This requires 
new technical skills and managerial capabilities for successful development. Modern 
firms have to have substantial in-house capacity to recognize, evaluate, negotiate, 
and finally adapt the technology potentially available from different sources. 
In the EU, the innovations are among key priorities of the development [Innovation 
Policy in Europe, 2008]. Co-operation in S&T and innovation and R&D have strong 
support among European population. Innovation is considered as a key element 
of mordernisation of the European economy and a major factor of competitiveness 
of the EU industry [Hashi, Welfens, Wziatek-Kubiak, 2007].  
On the other hand, post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine, are suffering from low 
level of innovation activities and widening gap between the industry and research 
institutions, both in government and higher education sectors. This is reflected in 
declining (or stagnant) share of R&D financing from the side of industry, shrinking 
civilian R&D in business sector, declining share of graduates in natural sciences and 
engineering and some other indicators.  
It is evident that the Triple Helix (TH) concept is a useful instrument for analyzing 
current situation within Ukrainian innovation system thanks to its universalism and 
flexibility [Etzkowitz, Ranga, 2012]. However, it is worth to stress that the TH concept 
has found its interesting transformation in the publications of the Russian and Ukrainian 
authors in recent years. Analyzing the processes of creation and development of the 
national innovation systems in these countries some of them propose to consider 
incomplete TH models, which describe the situation in these countries more adequately. 
Thus, TH model transforms into several different ‘double helix” models of co-operation 
between different sectors of national economies [Dezhina, Saltykov, 2006]. This approach 
reflects serious difficulties with innovation policy in the biggest post-Soviet states and 
certain fragmentation of the innovation systems. As a result, we will consider relations 
between the government and industry and the government and universities independently 
to some extent in this article. We will also pay attention to the state research sector, which 
constitutes an important part of the national innovation system of the country.  
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2. Development of the innovation system in Ukraine in recent years 
 
Almost all Ukrainian governments in the last decade have declared their inten-
tions to support innovation development and to stimulate structural changes in the 
national economy to make it more innovative and competitive. However, lack of 
economic reforms and orientation on development of traditional industries of the 
national economies, such as metallurgy and fuel production prevents Ukraine from 
focusing on knowledge production sectors. Lack on demand on R&D results widens 
the gap between the remaining R&D establishments and industrial enterprises.  
In 2000-2008 the country has demonstrated substantial economic growth with the 
average annual level of approximately 7%. Slowdown in the world economy in the second 
half of 2008 and in 2009 had serious impact on the Ukrainian economy, country’s 
GDP declined by more than 14 %. A lot of Ukrainian enterprises had to stop their pro-
duction. Some sectors have declined by more than a third during 2008-2009. Crisis cre-
ated great problems in the financial sphere, especially for heavily indebted private com-
panies, which reduced their R&D budgets substantially. In 2013, the country’s GDP 
had not reached the pre-crisis level. In 2014, after political crisis, GDP plunged again to 
the new ’bottom’ level, and in 2015 the decline by another 9% is expected. Innova-
tion activity has dropped simultaneously.  
The Ukrainian economy has clear export orientation but the bulk of the exported 
products are ferrous metals, basic chemicals and agricultural products with low level 
of value added. Technological modernisation was not a priority for Ukrainian business 
leaders. In recent years these sectors were indirectly subsidized through the system 
regulated prices for the input products (especially gas and energy), high artificial 
employment level and so on, while innovation companies had no special incentives 
to introduce new products and processes. Active collaboration with foreign companies 
can be an important ingredient of successful enterprise restructuring, particularly when 
competitive technologies are closely held, when export marketing links are crucial, or 
when outside methods and accountability are needed. 
The decisions of the previous Ukrainian governments to preserve some high–tech 
industries under the state control (space and aviation are the most vivid examples) 
at the initial stages of reform are a clear example of such behaviour. In other sectors the 
government had intentions to provide selective support for a relatively small number of 
foreign companies. Very often the reasons for such support were not clear enough 
or some state officials preferred to arrange deals with one or two foreign partner on 
non-competitive basis. Internationalization of production in modern economy requires 
competitive strategies that are coherent in the face of powerfully supported international 
rivals, and generally requires reliable allies. This also requires creation of equal 
opportunities for different companies from the side of the state, as well as support 
of innovative companies are key precondition for successful restructuring and further 
development. The last evaluation of the Ukrainian innovation capacities on the base 
of indicators of the European Innovation Scoreboard was made in 2011 and it showed, 
that the country was lagging behind of the EU states and some its non-EU neighbours 
(see picture 1). 
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CHART 1.  
The place of Ukraine according to the value of SII (in comparison with  
selected EU countries), 2008-2010 
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Legend: UA – Ukraine, RS- Russia, TR – Turkey, BG – Bulgaria, RO – Romania, PL – Poland, 
HU – Hungary, PT – Portugal, EU – average figure for the EU countries, IS – Spain, FR – France, 
DE – Germany, FI – Finland, SE – Sweden  
Source: [Enhance Innovation Policies…, 2011]. 
 
It is important to stress that Ukraine had high marks for the level of education of 
population and some relative financial indicators, such as share of expenditures on IT in 
GDP, but the country demonstrated poor performance in patent statistics and innovation 
support policy. The problems of the R&D in Ukraine developed over many years 
and have now reached such proportions that neither quick nor inexpensive solutions 
are feasible. The challenge to government policy in the S&T area is how to mould the 
remaining national research capabilities into a pattern that will contribute more effectively 
to the processes of economic recovery. For the time being, however, R&D 'assets' are 
considered largely as a liability.  
At the same time, in some cases, research institutes and design bureaus in Ukraine 
contain the results of R&D, which represent a potential of millions of dollars in commer-
cial value. However, technologies for domestic development and technologies and 
products ready for competition in the world market are different things. Anyway, 
there is a potential opportunity for establishing more ‘balanced’ relations with Western 
partners in these cases. Some leading research institutes have already transformed them-
selves into research- production companies, with preservation of some R&D and 
creation a dozens of spin-offs that are doing business, including production of goods, 
on the base of former institutes. Such examples are not numerous among technology-
oriented institutes in Ukraine. Very often these companies could not overcome relatively 
high entry barriers that exist in foreign markets, especially in developed countries. Costs, 
related to patenting, marketing and dissemination of their products appear unacceptable 
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in many cases. So, they are moving to the emerging markets of South-East Asian 
countries, Iran and some other states. However, such strategy could not be considered 
as a long-term one. Situation in the lowest segments of the market is usually strain 
and unstable. To be competitive companies have to try to enter the largest and the 
most sophisticated markets.  
Decline of R&D financing in 1990s-2000s, when almost all research budgets were 
spent on wages and on bills for utilities has led to the situation, when the share of 
modern research equipment has shrunk by several times in many research institutes. 
About halve of all equipment could be written off balances of research institutes ac-
cording to existing rules but this equipment has no adequate substitution [Yakubovskii, 
2009]. Some institutes had to stop regular scientific experiments, needed for undertaking 
research programs. For example, the only experimental reactor in the Ukrainian In-
stitute for Nuclear Physics was terminated in the first half of 1990s thanks to lack 
of funds to cover electricity bills. Since this time, Ukrainian nuclear physicists had very 
few opportunities to check their theoretical results. Similar situation was in the other 
natural sciences’ institutes. This means that Ukrainian scientists had limited opportunities 
to obtain new competitive results. However, sometimes, it is possible to work in 
the Western countries due to special research schemes, which were introduced in 
1990s-2000s within Framework programmes and other initiatives.  
It is also important to stress that in the 1990s-2000s numerous mechanisms of 
business support were created with the state participation. In principle, they could 
be used to support innovation and research activities. Total number of business centres 
and business incubators is about 500. However, very few of them work effectively. 
The problem is that almost all types of business support organizations, with the exception 
of three technoparks were not oriented towards supporting innovation development 
(these three only out of 16 were related to innovation and R&D activities). 
Up to now, the main focus of government policy mix is on direct support of in-
novation in the form of (partial) financing of S&T programs and provision of direct 
financing to selected innovation projects. Till the 2005, techoparks had some tax incen-
tives for stimulating innovation activities but the abolishment of these incentives in ear-
ly 2005 led to stagnation of technopark’s development. In Ukraine, other 
mechanisms for supporting innovation enterprises are underdeveloped and they are 
often used in a pervasive way. So, in Ukraine in 1990s, almost all money from the 
specially created State Innovation Fund was spent on projects, which were not related 
to development of innovation businesses or technology transfer.  
On the other hand, there are several ‘ministerial’ systems of organisations, which 
could be used to develop the system of innovation support. The Ministry of Education 
and Science has special centres of S&T information in almost every Ukrainian region 
(oblast). The biggest centre in Kiev has up to 100 employees. It collects information 
from local centres on all registered R&D projects and has to disseminate useful in-
formation on promising R&D results and innovation. The centres are more successful in 
undertaking the first task.  
The most important barrier to innovation activities in Ukrainian enterprises is 
the lack of financial resources. Enterprises rarely use bank loans to finance innova-
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tion activities as the interest rate is prohibitively high. It varied between 15 and 25% 
in 2006-2012, depending on the currency of the loan. Institutional barriers are also 
important, as well as a lack of demand in internal market. A number of venture ca-
pital funds were created in Ukraine under the special law in mid-2000s. However, their 
resources were exclusively used in the construction sector to finance boom in the 
property market. There is no information about support of innovation projects 
from the side of these funds. The State Agency of Ukraine on Investment and In-
novation (SAUII) has prepared a draft of new law on venture funds to direct finan-
cial resources into innovation sphere in 2008. The new law has to install barriers for 
the utilization of ‘innovation’ money on other purposes. Unfortunately, this draft has 
not been considered by the Parliament in recent years.  
Ukraine has initiated several innovation-related programs in the past. Most of them 
had disciplinary orientation on development of specific products, such as new computers 
or medicine. At the same time, some programs were formed as ‘organizational’ ones. 
So, in 2008-2009 the Ukrainian government developed and approved two state goal-
oriented programmes. The first is a Programme of the development of the system of 
information and analytical support of state innovation policy implementation. The 
key objective of the Programme is monitoring of innovation development of the 
Ukrainian economy. It was designed for three years with a total budget of 10.5 m. 
Hr. The key idea of the Programme was to create effective instruments of monitoring 
of the state innovation policy at the level of central government and on the level of 
regions. Initially, there were plans to establish special groups at the state and 
regional levels, which could collect data, conduct surveys and prepare analytical 
materials on the situation in the innovation sphere. These groups had to work 
under the guidance of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine. The second 
programme is the Programme of creation of innovation infrastructure in Ukraine. It 
was designed for five years with the budget of 280 m Hr. Ukr. It is assumed that the 
Programme will receive financing from different sources: from the state budget (104 m 
Hr.), local budgets (about 80 m Hr.), and other sources (private business and 
international donors – 96 m Hr.). The government hoped to attract investors to 
create technology transfer centres for small businesses within this Programme. Private 
companies could benefit from using the newly-created elements of infrastructures by 
provision of different services and products to innovation companies and by 
obtaining some privileges, including access to cheaper (subsidised) bank loans, 
information and expertise from the state research centres. Unfortunately, both 
programs had no proper financial resources in 2009-2012 and they were terminated 
in 2012-2013.  
However, some programs were more successful. So, the Ukrainian Parliament has 
passed the new State Goal-oriented Space Program for 2013-2017. This Program is the 
fifth such program in Ukrainian history since 1992. The main aim of the program is to 
integrate activities of enterprises and research institutes in the space sector and to utilize 
R&D results more effectively up to the needs of sustainable development and national 
security. The program includes eight subprograms (similar to the previous ones), aimed 
at development new satellites for communication and the research of the Earth from 
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the space; further development of infrastructure; experimental projects on new space 
technologies; and joint commercial projects with other countries, first of all – the 
USA, EU countries, Brazil, Russia and some others. Ukraine has substantial S&T 
potential in certain important space technologies but during the economic crisis of 
the 1990s the country lost some of it. Now the country has to utilize more effectively 
the existing capabilities and has to develop new technologies and products to be involved 
in international efforts in space research and commercial exploitation of space technol-
ogies. In fact, it is very difficult to conduct space projects without co-operation with 
key international players in this area. That is why such co-operation is foreseen in 
the Program. However, in conditions of conflict in the East of the country and 
worsening of relations with Russia, perspectives of the implementation of the pro-
gram look modest.  
At the same time, it is important to stress, that problems of the R&D and in-
novation in Ukraine have developed over many years and they have now reached 
such proportions that neither quick nor inexpensive solutions are feasible. The challenge 
to government policy in the S&T area is how to mould the remaining national research 
capabilities into a pattern that will contribute more effectively to the processes of 
economic recovery. For the time being, however, R&D 'assets' are considered largely as 
a liability. It is evident that the growth of R&D expenses itself could not solve institu-
tional problems that exist in Ukraine. Despite official support for 'national science,' 
the R&D sector is not a focal point of economic policy in Ukraine. Different laws 
are not properly coordinated as they are prepared by different interest groups. The 
most vivid examples are related to the permanent conflicts between the Ministries 
of Finances and the Ministries, which are responsible for S&T. For instance, in Ukraine, 
thanks to superiority of the Budget law over all other laws, the Ministry of Finance 
blocks all initiatives, aimed at support of R&D and innovation activities. The main 
reason for this blockade is the hypothetical possibility of the state income decline. 
Calculations of indirect benefits (in the form of new working places, growth of ex-
port and so on) are not taken into account.  
 
 
3. Key features of the transformation of Ukrainian research system 
 
Branch institutes had leading positions in the Ukrainian research system in the past. 
In some cases, the collapse of the old branch structure of the Soviet-type economy led 
to the development of new links between research institutes and industrial firms and, 
especially, to the development of direct links with foreign companies. At the same time, 
the changing boundaries between private and public sectors led to new, nationally 
specific systems of innovations.  
One might expect that some applied research institutes and design bureaus were 
transformed into relatively small research or production companies and science-based 
SMEs. However, their future depends heavily on the speed of economic transformation 
in key manufacturing industries. If Ukrainian manufacturing enterprises develop better 
access to international markets and strong ties with foreign partners, this will have 
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an obvious and positive effect on industry-oriented R&D institutions. Without clear 
signals from the industry in the form of new orders and, in some cases, without sufficient 
financial support, research institutes will be unable to retain their best staff or to 
update their technical base.  
In contrast with the branch institutes and design bureaus, research institutes of the 
Academy of Sciences in Ukraine rely on the state budget as the main source of their 
financing. They receive approximately three quarters of their funds directly from the 
state. This level of financing does not guarantee effective development but provides 
basis for survival of research institutes. In recent years, the number of employees in the 
Academies has stabilized, while the number of research institutes doubled. The share of 
the Academies of Sciences in the total financing R&D and the share in the total 
number of employees in research sector have increased in recent years [Yegorov, 2009]. 
There are more than 300 universities in Ukraine. More than two thirds of the 
country’s doctorate holders are working there. However, contribution of universities 
into R&D activities remains relatively small. Universities received 5-7% of all R&D 
funds in recent decade. The higher education sector and the private non-profit sector 
have not plaid a significant role in the R&D financing both retrospectively and in the 
current period. The higher education sector as an executing agent of R&D is still 
extremely dependent from the state financing (the range of the state funds was 
68.7%-74.7% of the total financing of the universities in the last two decades).  
The gap between the higher education sector and the industry is substantial. Current 
legislation does not allow universities or research institutes to be founders of a spin-off 
company with non-state ownership in Ukraine. At the same time, it is evident that 
problems of innovation development could be solved only within broader context of 
transformation of the national economy. Another factor, that has negative impact 
on innovation, is the armed conflict in the East of the country: Ukrainian authorities 
simply are not focusing on non-military issues. 
Universities are trying to change the situation. On December 20th, 2006 special Law 
on scientific parks passed through Parliament. The key feature of this law is that it does 
not contain norms, aimed at obtaining specific financial incentives for parks. There were 
plans to create a number of such parks within the country’s technical universities. 
However, economic crisis of 2008-2009 has ruined these plans. Very few scientific 
parks have been created in Ukraine since this time. The most well-known of them is 
the Kiev Polytechnic Institute (University) Science Park in Kiev. The University tries to 
implement the idea of Triple Helix at different stages of its functioning. Initially, the 
park was created as a part of the EU-sponsored Tacis-Tempus project (2004-2006), 
aimed at bridging the gap between the universities and business. The University and 
its partners have created 5 special foundations to provide financial resources for the 
innovation projects. Students spend up to 30% of their learning time on innovation 
studies. Special ‘start-up’ school has been created too. In 2014, rector of the University 
expressed an opinion, that only 10% of students could be entrepreneurs but the 
knowledge of innovation processes is useful for all graduates. More than 110 start-ups 
have been created in this science park, and more than 150 different products have been 
commercialized. Total financing from business reached 23.4 million Hr. in 2014. 
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University has plans to build special Science City with approximately 5500 employees 
and 170 million USD of investment [Bazhal, 2015]. Another model is used by the 
Science Park in Kiev Shevchenko University. This park has five different stakeholders, 
including another university and 3 research institutes of the National Academy of 
Sciences. However, this park was not so successful, as previous one.  
Ukrainian universities should be given a certain degree of financial autonomy.  This 
will allow them to perform quickly certain financial transactions and to avoid long 
bureaucratic procedures, which are used by the Treasury of Ukraine. An additional 
incentive for commercialization could be a granting the universities rights to distribute 
funds, derived from contract research, as well as to utilize revenues from the licensing 
of intellectual property. According to international practice, such steps are usually 
aimed at creating and improving university technology transfer centers, to support re-
search and development international projects, upgrade technological support, etc. 
A greater degree of autonomy of universities will allow them to use such source 
of commercialization of intellectual property as venture capital. Another source of 
funding is specialized investment funds, whose activities are concentrated in poten-
tially profitable innovation projects. This practice is common in developed countries 
and it allows to receive substantial effect from scientific and technological development. 
On the practical side, the adoption of draft laws ‘On venture funds of innovation 
development’ and ‘On venture investment companies’ could give impetus to the re-
vival of innovation sphere and to commercialization of scientific results in Ukraine, 
both for companies and for higher education sector. 
In response to the challenges of modern times, the world's leading universities have 
felt the need of transformation – they turned to the powerful academic centers that 
produce new scientific development and training products in the future enter the 
market. These entrepreneurial universities represent an economic corporation that 
produces knowledge, and individual faculties have the opportunity to test their 
competitiveness in the market and receive from this income, which is aimed at the 
development of the university. Central to their work is technology transfer and com-
mercialization of research results. As these universities interested in obtaining the 
maximum added value from the commercialization of its own technology, they contribute 
to the growth of the projects from an idea to a successful business or technological 
implementation [Excellence v Equity…, 2015]. Ukrainian universities have to follow 
this practice.  
While the principles and practice of financial support of R&D is of considerable 
concern, the aging of the research community, outflow of research personnel from 
R&D institutes and the obsolescence of their research equipment pose another threats 
to the future of R&D systems in Ukraine. The bulk of researchers in Ukraine are of 
mature age (average age of Doctor of Sciences is over 61), and the opportunities for 
recruiting young scientists are very limited. Gifted young persons could chose between 
a research career in developed countries and work in business that brings much higher 
income than work in the national research establishments. The same applies to the ag-
ing of research equipment. It is clear that without remedial actions, the productivity of 
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the system will continue to fall, with negative consequences for the economy as 
a whole.  
Ukraine urgently needs not only a serious transformation within the S&T system, 
but also important changes in their environment. So, the introduction of adequate legal 
protection for intellectual property rights, especially in foreign countries, is of critical 
importance for individual researchers, S&T institutes and science-based SMEs. This 
is also very important for foreign companies seeking to engage in direct investment 
or some other form of business alliance, and for domestic companies that co-operate 
with them. 
 
 
4. Cooperation with the EU countries and its impact on the transformation 
of research system in Ukraine 
 
In 2002, Ukraine signed an agreement with the EU on S&T co-operation, including 
basic and applied research and technology development. Key thematic areas of co-
operation were also determined. They comprise environmental and climate research, 
including observation of the Earth's surface; biomedical research and health protection; 
agriculture, forestry and fishery; industrial technologies; material science and metrology; 
non-nuclear power engineering; transport; information society technologies; social 
research; S&T policy studies; training and the exchange of specialists. This agreement 
supplemented earlier documents that were signed in the 1990s (The Agreement on 
Partnership and Collaboration between Ukraine and the EU and some others), opening 
the way for co-operation between Ukraine and the EU in different areas of science 
and education (programmes such as Tacis-Ace, Tacis-Tempus and INTAS).  
In 2005, Ukraine and the EU signed an Action Plan, containing important refe-
rences to the need to develop co-operation in R&D. The Action Plan was an im-
portant component of the European Neighborhood Policy Initiative (ENPI). Recently 
the Ukrainian Parliament has approved an official Ukrainian application to Eureka. 
Ukraine has a number of bilateral agreements on S&T co-operation with individual 
EU countries, which complement the main agreement with the EU. In recent years, 
all Ukrainian governments have announced their intention to develop closer relations 
with the EU, and European Union policy has a strong influence on formulation of 
science policy in Ukraine. 
Ukraine concluded a new agreement with the EU on S&T co-operation in 2010, 
which was implemented in 2011. It could open new opportunities for co-operation and 
it creates framework conditions for a number of joint initiatives. Bearing in mind the in-
tention of the country to join the EU in the future, the Ukrainian authorities are in-
terested in harmonisation of national research policy with EU policy. The Research 
Framework Programmes, which bring together research organisations from EU 
member-states, is one form of co-operation that has become available for Ukraine 
since the early 1990s, during the Third Framework Programme (FP3), when an 
agreement for partnership and collaboration was signed between Ukraine and the EU. 
The country signed an agreement on association with the EU Horizon-2020 program 
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in March, 2015. This opens the way for more active co-operation with the EU countries 
in R&D in the near future. The impact of the participation in the EU FPs is definitely 
positive, as Ukrainian scientists receive valuable new experience and knowledge, and 
strengthen their contacts with western partners. On the other hand, this impact is 
limited as the number of participants is not high. Co-operation between Ukrainian and 
EU researchers remains relatively low. Additional support from the Ukrainian govern-
ment for the promotion of FP activities is needed as well as additional links be-
tween Ukrainian researchers and their EU counterparts to forge partnerships in fu-
ture projects. Support for capacity- building measures in research and innovation 
through ENPI could help in this regard. As a non-EU member, Ukraine cannot partic-
ipate (at least, as a leading partner) in some FP-related initiatives. Another problem 
is that existing internal taxation practices do not support international project im-
plementation, despite there being some clauses in EU-Ukraine agreements on special 
financial conditions for R&D projects. This creates serious barriers for co-operation.  
There is no direct influence of the EU Programme on priority-setting in Ukraine, 
although the Ukrainian policy-makers study the content of the FPs attentively and the 
results of these studies are used to formulate research agendas in different ministries, 
universities and state academies of sciences [Zinchenko, 2013]. As to the results of 
the previous co-operation programs, they are analyzed in one of our paper, pub-
lished recently [Yegorov, Ranga, 2014].  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In general, R&D and innovation sectors in Ukraine remain unreformed and un-
derutilized. It is evident now that lessening state control over the process of transi-
tion is not having the desired effect in many cases, especially in transforming the R&D 
system. Weakness and uncertainty of S&T policy has conspired with the economic 
crisis to inflict losses in terms of manpower and technical assets in Ukraine, and indeed 
to produce unfavourable structural changes. The crisis in Ukraine could be solved only 
by co-ordinated efforts on the part of the state and scientific communities. The challenge 
to government policy in the S&T area is how to mould the remaining national research 
capabilities into a form that will contribute better to the process of economic recovery 
and further development. For the time being, however, R&D 'assets' are viewed 
largely as a liability. This is partly the result of structural and organisational mismatches, 
and partly because of their low immediate relevance to market realities. Creation of 
favourable conditions for science-based SMEs could help to solve the problem of 
adequate utilization of intellectual capacities of former scientists and engineers and 
it also could contribute to the positive structural changes in the national economies, 
which have high shares of traditional heavy industries.  
The transformation of national innovation system with special attention to co-
operation between enterprises, state research institutes and universities is critically im-
portant for the country. Ukraine needs much more institutions that would have po-
tential to finance innovation sector. These institutions have to accept high level of 
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risks for high potential profits and the same time, they will not require collateral, nor 
charge interest payments. It would be also important to provide not only short-term, 
but also long-term and at least medium term loans and to contribute to boost innovation 
activities. As to the business environment, it is very useful to create conditions, where en-
trepreneurs will be willing to sell significant part of their shares to outsiders and also 
they will be willing either to be acquired or to participate in public offerings. Labour 
market has to be sufficiently flexible, as top quality managers and technologists will be 
available to staff of growing firms.  
It is evident that, at the current stage of development, it would be extremely difficult 
to obtain financing for innovative enterprises from private sources in Ukraine. That is 
why the state has to play more active role in stimulating creation and development of 
such cooperation within the national innovation system in Ukraine. In some cases, even 
such mechanisms as long-gestation projects, involving basic research with the state 
support could be justified. There is a plethora of different types of incentives, which 
government could use, including financial and fiscal incentives, direct lending pro-
grammes and so on. The problem lies in choosing right combination of these incentives, 
as government involvement easily creates market distortions, cause problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection. 
The government has to accept that innovative enterprises and research institutes 
need special treatment and it has to develop mechanisms, aimed on their support. This 
will have positive impact on industrial structure and the general economic indicators, as 
such enterprises usually have better cost structure and higher value-added than non-
innovative enterprises. Programs on supporting dissemination of innovations in industrial 
companies have also to be initiated. Absolute majority of these companies have no 
enough knowledge about the best practices in their industries, nor enough resources to 
introduce innovations. Utilization of modern technologies and switching to new products 
could lead to substantial growth of productivity and positive changes in other economic 
indicators.  
Bearing in mind rapid changes in technology and markets and the increasing focus 
on exports, banks, private venture funds and state organizations have to develop specific 
expertise in project evaluation. Existing technologies and know-how could be commer-
cialized, and bring substantial dividends to the countries in transition. At the same time, 
technology transfer from the West could help to solve not purely economic, but in some 
cases, severe environmental and social problems, from which Ukraine is suffering, too.  
Special attention has to be paid to the development of cooperation with the EU 
states. This cooperation brings important expertise in the most advanced areas, and 
it will help to compensate above-mentioned shortcomings of the national innovation 
system of Ukraine. In terms of TH model, this cooperation will be important for 
transformation of existing ‘partial’ (‘dual’) ‘sub-models into functioning three-part model, 
which is common for developed countries. Some preconditions for widening of such 
cooperation are in place, as Ukrainian researchers are trying to take part more actively in 
the EU scientific initiatives. It is important now to attract Ukrainian companies to joint 
innovation projects. At the same time, the level of coordination of innovation and 
science policies with the EU programmes has to higher. In this case the chances of 
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success could rise, as the some Ukrainian neighbours from Eastern and Central Europe 
have demonstrated.  
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